

## 2013-06-23: Message from Che-Bao Ma (馬哲保)

Dear All:

The following two recent articles in *The Economist* seem to indicate the economics achievement and political development in Mainland China are indeed pointing toward the likelihood of an ultimate peaceful political settlement of Cross-Taiwan-Strait relations, which I wrote you as **a bold predication to be reached in 7 years** (that is, by 2020) in my last group email distributed yesterday.

(1) The cover story titled "Towards the end of poverty" (The Economist June 1st 2013). I quote a few paragraphs from wherein as in the following:

IN HIS inaugural address in 1949 Harry Truman said that "more than half the people in the world are living in conditions approaching misery. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of those people." It has taken much longer than Truman hoped, but the world has lately been making extraordinary progress in lifting people out of extreme poverty. Between 1990 and 2010, their number fell by half as a share of the total population in developing countries, from 43% to 21% --- a reduction of almost 1 billion people.

Now the world has a serious chance to redeem Truman's pledge to lift the least fortunate. Of the 7 billion people alive on the planet, 1.1 billion subsist below the internationally accepted extreme-poverty line of \$1.25 a day. Starting this week and continuing over the next year or so, the UN's usual Who's Who of politicians and officials from governments and international agencies will meet to draw up a new list of targets to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS), which were set in September 2000 and expire in 2015. Governments should adopt as their main new goal the aim of reducing by another billion the number of people in extreme poverty by 2030.

China (which has never shown any interest in MDGS) is responsible for three-quarters of the achievement. Its economy has been growing so fast that, even though inequality has been growing so fast, extreme poverty is disappearing. China pulled 680m people out of misery in 1981-2010, and reduced its extreme-poverty rate from 84% in 1980 to 10% now.

But the biggest poverty-reduction measure of all is liberalising markets to let poor people get richer. That means freeing trade between countries (Africa is still cruelly punished by tariffs) and within them (China's real leap forward occurred because it allowed private business to grow). Both India and Africa are crowded with monopolies and restrictive practices. Many Westerners have reacted to recession by seeking to constrain markets and roll globalisation back in their own countries, and they want to export these ideas to the developing world, too. It does not need such advice. It is doing quite nicely, largely thanks to the same economic principles that helped the developed world grow rich and could pull the poorest of the poor out of destitution.

(2) An article titled "Tibet policy --- Bold new proposals" (The Economist June 22nd 2013, pp. 30-31) as the attached pdf document.

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The sign of change as pointed out by the author is in the interest of Mainland China itself as well as others including Taiwan. The road map from bold proposal to bold action takes time and patience. We shall wait and see. I like the concluding sentence, in which it says: the independence movement of Tibet is now kept in check by the Dalai Lama's search for a "middle way". I believe the Dalai Lama's wisdom of "middle way" approach is also to everyone's benefit in dealing with the complicated problem of the Cross-Taiwan-Strait relations.

I have added a few more names to the forwarding (Cc) list including the honorable Legislator (Chen), a CEO (Chen), three distinguished professors (Jahn of NTU-earth sciences; and Chou and Lee of Tsing-Hua University-nuclear engineering), four Harvard acquaintances (Walker, Klein, Austria, and Ohashi), four high-school classmates (Kuo, Lian, Wu, and **Cheng**), three former INER directors (Ting, Hsia, and Chou), two current members of INER staff (Lee and Liao), two couples of my in-laws (Yenfa & Ming-Chuan; Ming-Kuang & Mei-Hong), my family friend (Han-Wen), my son (Wann-Jiun) and my niece (Yann-Jiun). For their reference, I have attached also the previous 4 documents.

For the email exchanges attached below, I have made a few corrections of the typos and rewritten some of my original passages.

Thank you for your time and patience. Wish all of you a happy summer time.

Che-Bao Ma 2013/6/23 8:10 PM, Taipei



# 馬胡掌權，兩岸和解？

淡江大學國際事務與戰略研究所教授／  
**林中斌**

**兩**位國際投資機構人士最近向我分析，台灣民間目前出現固定資產投資上升、流動資產投資下降的現象。原因是弊案使大家覺得二〇〇八年會換黨執政，兩岸和解有希望，經濟會轉好。

假設胡錦濤在明年十七大將他的人馬安排到位，掌握了更多實權，也假設〇八年馬英九當選總統，兩岸不無復談、和解的可能；但也有變數和障礙。

馬英九和胡錦濤都不是典型的黨員。國民黨難以擺脫貪汙形象，但馬堅持反貪。馬公開為二二八道歉，過去國民黨沒做。雖然之前李登輝已道歉過，但李在國民黨比較另類，不像馬英九的出身「根正苗紅」。此外，自由時報和聯合報最近都有民調顯示，馬英九獲得的支持度遠遠超越國民黨。有些民眾討厭政黨但喜歡馬英九。胡錦濤是中國共產黨首位沒有蘇聯經驗的領導人。他的父親過去被共幹打壓，含冤而亡。所以他至今不肯返訪故里與鄉人分享榮耀。胡在文革初期爲了他的老師辯護而被批，於是選擇成爲旁觀的「逍遙派」。

近來胡不斷打壓媒體，在此動作的表象下，有一些鬆綁的試點。例如去年居然舉行趙紫陽的喪禮、邀請香港立法局議員全體去大陸、紀念胡耀邦的九十冥

誕、下令冰點復刊……。這一連串的事情，雖然做得很小，但都具突破性。西方觀察胡錦濤，有個辯論：到底他是極端保守者（ultra-conservative），還是在衣櫥裡的自由派（closet liberal）？我認爲他是一個務實的人。他會做這些嘗試，不因爲是自由派，而是看到政治不改革共產黨遲早要垮台。

因此，對於馬、胡兩人，不能以傳統的國民黨或共產黨來看待，他們可能有新的做法。

馬、胡要鞏固權力，分別面臨了一些考驗。對馬而言，首先是要整合團隊，處理其中卡位、不協調的問題；其次是要越過反改革的黨內大老向前邁進，卻避免黨分裂；第三要維護他個人的安全。對胡而言，則首先是將人馬安排到關鍵位置；二是健康問題；三是貫徹中央改革的政令到基層。目前北京的權威到副省長就下不去，地方上有許多貪腐欺壓黑幕，使基層民怨抗議愈來愈多，有如將爆發的火山。

國共都承認「九二共識」，恢復初步協商應該沒問題。但復談不代表和解。兩岸若有進展，馬、胡各須克服一些障礙。馬若當選，最大挑戰在如何約束黨員，對綠營寬大爲懷，否則即使藍營在國會占到七成，少數黨仍能癱瘓議事，杯葛兩岸互動。胡需要做

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中共在對台做法上也有改變，凡是對台灣人民有利的就做，對阿扁個人聲望有利的就不做，這一點北京分得非常清楚。過去一年共推出了至少二十項對台柔性作為，兩岸的基層板塊已經慢慢在移動了。

的則是針對台灣人民最反感的兩件事做改進，一是飛彈；二是國際空間。後者可以從非政治性的國際組織開始，不只落實台灣成為WHO觀察員，甚至主動爭取台灣在國際環保文化等組織中的地位。至於飛彈問題，其實是胡對美、對台很好的籌碼。他可以用撤除或銷毀部分飛彈來和美、台交換利益，然後逐步加碼創造討價還價空間。這就會推動兩岸良性的互動，像漁事糾紛、共同打擊犯罪等的議題便可有具體成果。

若能夠克服這些障礙，馬能安內、胡能進一步尊重台灣，則雙方進一步的和解就有可能。時間將落在二〇〇八至二〇一二年，也就是馬英九〇八年上台後，胡錦濤一二年七十歲下台之前。假設兩岸能夠和解，接下來會發生的事情，我預計至少有七項：

第一，國共可能互設辦事處。目前北京實際外交做得很起勁，甚至與許多國家非社會主義政黨進行政黨外交。中共會先與國民黨建立黨際代表處，再下一步則可能建立政府間的常駐機構。

第二，兩岸三通恢復後會帶動台灣旅遊、醫療、養生和美容工業的蓬勃發展。因為台灣在這方面比大陸超前許多。台灣東岸會因而繁榮。

第三，台北以後會更重視實質的外交。我們對一、二個具實質關係的國家，有許多經貿文化發展的空間。將來對爭取名分等象徵性的外交會酌量減少，因為我們資源有限。這可能帶來的負面影響是，我們政治性的對外主權會因而淡化。

第四，兩岸的軍事緊張會下降。解放軍對我部署的短程彈道飛彈可能逐步撤除。連帶的效應是美國會不太願意賣高科技武器給台灣。因為兩岸將來若整合，美國的武器就變成解放軍所有了。

第五，民進黨可能要自我調整，以便在新的環境下繼續運作。他們也許會重拾一九九九年台灣前途決議文的精神。

第六，蓬勃的文化企業會在大陸興起，而台灣將扮演重要的催化劑角色，因為這方面我們比較細膩而有深度。現在美國文化產業占GDP二五%（影音娛樂），英國二二%（電影服裝），日本約九%，韓國七%，中國大陸號稱三%，但他們的官員私下說其實只有一%。現在對岸發現老祖宗的東西很好賣，孔學、武術、考古、中醫，加上電影、選美……都開始熱門。而且北京也發現這些在外交上非常好用，因此文化企業一定會大幅成長，擴大了兩岸合作的空間。

第七，台灣的民主會漸漸的改變大陸。一開始可能是選舉技術的提供。他們看我們連謝馬都抓起來，「為何大陸不能？」這種影響會一點一滴浸入對岸民心及制度。

現在兩岸大架構的模式轉移 (paradigm shift) 已經開始。三、五十年來北京對台政策綱領已不再提。去年北京開始不提「一國兩制」、「不放棄對台用武」；今年「新胡四點」中，「和平統一」和「一個中國原則」也消失了（但不表示放棄一中的觀念）。

另一方面，北京耕耘台灣社會，包括去年高規格接待連戰、對國民黨將領在二次大戰的貢獻做平反。這些在他們高層內部都有爭議。李長春反對，但胡錦濤和曾慶紅聯手克服阻礙。中共在對台做法上也有改變，凡是對台灣人民有利的就做，對阿扁個人聲望有利的就不做，這一點北京分得非常清楚。過去一年共推出了至少二十項對台柔性作為，兩岸的基層板塊已經慢慢在移動了。（田習如整理）

# 資本主義尚有未來嗎？

名 人 堂



今日登場 林中斌

在自由市場裡，如果每人白頭賺錢，社會整體會因而受益，因為有隻「看不見的手」(invisible hand)會自動照顧大家趨向善足。這是資本主義大師亞當斯密兩百年前大作《國富論》中的名言。

○八年世界金融危機衝擊全球後，大家都惶惶不安。然而「看不見的手」依然看不見。之後，主張資本主義的學者參加會議都低頭不語。近年來，最時髦的學術會議題目是：資本主義尚有未來嗎？(Can capitalism survive?)

時光回流到一百年前。那時流行的是社會主義思潮：「資本主義帶來社會不均，富人愈富，窮人愈窮。」不只中共開國元勳如毛澤東、周恩來是信徒。連國父都受影響，而把「節制資本平均地權」納入民生主義。

九〇年，蘇聯東歐解體。共產主義或極端社會主義七十年的實驗失敗了。資本主義大勝，流行的思潮是一人生而不平等，讓聰明的人多賺錢，才會釋放社會的活力，使整體經濟蓬勃成長。這也是美國人一向的價值。

美國是資本主義大本營。正如第卅任總統柯立芝說：「美國人的要事就是生意。」(The chief business of the American people is business.)除了富足以外，美國令人羨慕的還有無窮的機會。林肯「平民可當上總統，卡內基靠光榮移民可成巨富。美國的富人和貧民都是少數，中產階級人數最多，因而穩定了社會。」

然而今天，這一切都變了。中產階級逐漸消失，美國成為兩極化的社會。只有少數富人，和多數的窮人。差距在擴大。

從七九年至〇七年，美國人收入增加多少？屬下五分之一的窮人，收入增加了百分之十六，屬上五分之一的富人，增加了百分之九十五，屬最上層百分之二的巨富，所得增加百分之兩百八十一！而且美國窮人致富的機會已降為世界第八位，低於北歐、西歐及加拿大七國。資本主義原來說，經濟成長下，一定會貧富不均。不均足必要之惡，也是成長的代價。但是最新的研究發現，貧富極端不均會限制經濟成長！因為「一位億萬富翁能買多少豪華遊艇？」只靠少數有錢人購物，整體消費會萎縮，經濟成長便下降。紐約Zew School教授David H. Autor比較美國和瑞典發現這是真的。瑞典對富人課稅比美國重，因而限制貧富不均，但它成長高於美國。

加拿大Dalhousie大學Tan Okeke教授比較美國、加拿大、墨西哥，有類似發現。

此外，能扣之加拿大Rahman Raj教授指出資本主義兩項項危機：金融波動和社會不安。少數人有錢，多數人不夠，導致兩個結果。一、政府必須借錢給多數人，國家財務變脆弱，引發通貨危機。二、社會裡多數人吃虧，抗議動亂跟著來。

根據華府智庫「美國企業研究院」Charles Murray博士十二年出版的書《斷裂》(Coming Apart)，美國社會已斷成兩塊，中間隔了鴻溝。少數的上族群，收入高，離婚率低，教育程度和就業率高，上教堂比率高。多數的，族群剛好相反。兩族群之間缺少往來，缺乏同情。這是政治和社會變遷的預兆。

美國天主教大學John J. Reilly教授今年一月在「外交事務」季刊發表「資本主義與不均」提出解決之道：有錢的人要割捨所得換取社會的穩定。

拯救資本主義要靠同情心。其實，亞當斯密斯自認為他兩本大作中《道德情操》優於《國富論》，而前者的中心思想就是「同情心」。(作者為獲JOLA金獎碩士後曾任美國Manville公司兼任財務分析師，現為退休國際關係及戰略教授)

## 2013-06-23: Message from Che-Bao Ma (馬哲保)

Tibet Policy ---Bold New Proposals

The Economist June 22nd2013, pp.30-31

Welcome signs that some officials are at last starting to question policies on Tibet

FEW outside China think the Communist Party's strategy for Tibet working. A combination of economic development and political repression was meant to reconcile Tibetans to Chinese rule and wean them off their loyalty to the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader. Instead disaffection is still rife, especially among the young. And all across Tibetan areas of China, Tibetans still display the Dalai Lama's portrait, sometimes openly. Since March 2011 more than 100 Tibetans ---especially in Tibetan areas of provinces bordering what China calls the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) ---have set themselves on fire. Most have done so in part to call for the Dalai Lama's homecoming. An overwhelming security presence and the Dalai Lama's commitment to non-violence mean that the unrest is easily contained. Hence little has suggested that China's leaders are concerned about the bleak implications for the future: that their rule in Tibet can be maintained only by the indefinite deployment of massive coercive force.

So for a Chinese scholar, Jin Wei, who is director of ethnic and religious studies at the Central Party School in Beijing, to call for a "creative" new approach is startling. For her to do so publicly, in an interview this month with Hong Kong magazine, *Asia Weekly*, suggests that she has high-level backing. A report from a Beijing think-tank in 2009 challenged the official line that rioting in Tibet the year before was instigated from abroad. But Robert Barnett, a professor of Tibetan studies at Columbia University in New York, describes Ms Jin's intervention as a sign that, after two decades, "debate has re-emerged within China about the government's hardline policies in Tibet". Ms Jin even accused former party chiefs in Tibet of being "biased against the practice of religious affairs". This, she said, "foreshadowed the accumulation of grievances today."

One former party secretary in Tibet (from 1988-92) was Hu Jintao, who went on to head the party nationally for ten years until last November, when he gave way to Xi Jinping. Those who have forecast that Mr Xi might prove a bolder reformer than the cautious Mr Hu have so far seen little to back them up. Here, on Tibet, is at least a hint of crack in the hardline consensus. Some have detected another in the appointment of Yu Zhengsheng to head the party's main policy group on Tibet and Xinjiang, a Muslim-majority region in the north-east. Mr Yu is the head of an advisory body designed to promote national unity. Previous heads of the group have been security specialists.

Ms Jin's analysis, though couched in the terminology of party orthodoxy, is similar to that of many foreign observers. She argues that, by demonising the Dalai Lama, and viewing any expression of Tibetan culture as potentially subversive, the party has turned even those Tibetans sympathetic to its aims against it. The struggle has evolved from "a contradiction between the central government and the Dalai Lama separatist clique into an ethnic conflict between Han Chinese and Tibetans".

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She is not advocating a new soft approach to “political” issues, such as the Dalai Lama’s call for greater autonomy for Tibet and Tibetans’ hankering after a “greater Tibet”---ie, within its historic borders, beyond the TAR. But in fact, most protests in Tibet are not about “politics”, defined like this. Many have been sparked by anger at Chinese repression ---of Tibetan culture, language and tradition, or of individual protesters. It is a vicious circle, made worse by anger at the large-scale immigration into Tibet of Han Chinese.

Ms Jin has ideas on how to break the impasse. Talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, stalled since the most recent of nine fruitless rounds in 2010, should resume, she says. They should concentrate on “easy” issues first, setting contentious debate about Tibet’s status to one side for now. China should consider inviting the Dalai Lama to visit one of its semi-autonomous cities, Hong Kong or Macau, and eventually allowing him back to Tibet. It should also try to defuse the crisis his death will bring by agreeing with him on a chosen reincarnation from inside China’s borders. Otherwise, China risks having to deal with two incarnations: one it endorses and one in exile who is more likely to be revered by most Tibetans.

One of the many obstacles to Ms Jin’s unlikely vision is the identity of China’s negotiating partner. China will only talk to Dalai Lama’s representative. But two years ago the Dalai Lama retired from his “political” role, ceding it to an elected “prime minister” of the exiles’ government, Lobsang Sangay. Mr Sangay has not done a good job of uniting the exiles and winning their trust. In any event China will not even contemplate talking to him. The Dalai Lama may need, in one respect at least, to come out of retirement.

The debate Ms Jin’s comments have provoked will not bring any immediate relief to Tibetans in Tibet. The infrastructure of Chinese repression is being enhanced and refined, with the implementation of a new “grid” system of street-level surveillance. Dissenters are still locked up every week.

Moreover Ms Jin’s is still a lone voice, at least in public. Few others seem to realize that a new approach in Tibet is in China’s interest. Not only would it ease tension in Tibet; it would help relations with other minorities in China, make reunification with Taiwan more likely and improve China’s relations with the outside world. The more conventional Chinese view is the one voiced recently by a scholar at a Beijing think-tank: “The old Dalai will die soon. End of problem.” Though the Dalai Lama seems in good health, he turns 78 next month. The hope is that Ms Jin will not be the only Chinese adviser to understand that the dying in exile of this Dalai Lama would not be the end of China’s difficulties in Tibet. Rather, his death risks an explosion of violence and the rekindling of a Tibetan independence movement that is for now kept in check by the Dalai Lama’s search for a “middle way”.

\*\*\*\*\* END \*\*\*\*\*

## 2013-06-23: Message from Che-Bao Ma (馬哲保)

Hail, President. Well Met

In small but important ways, Obama and Xi moved the needle on U.S.-China relations  
FAREED ZAKARIA; COMMENTARY / WORLDVIEW; TIME June 24, 2013

WHILE WE WERE CONSUMED BY THE crises of the moment ---Turkey's riots, NSA snooping and Washington's "scandals"---something happened on June 7 and 8 that is potentially of more lasting importance. The Presidents of the U.S. and China held their most significant and successful meeting in the decades. It was a vital step forward in the crucial relationship ---between the world's superpower and its fastest-risingpower ---that will shape the 21stcentury.

Thesummit at Sunnylands, in California, was the result of months of preparation, led on by the American side by National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon. He explained to me the two teams agreed to a format that was a great break with the past: "Usually at meetings like these, each leader brings a set of talking points. This creates a format that highlights problems. This was different: We didn't come in with a set of complaints. The leaders came with ideas about opportunities. It created a completely different discussion and dynamic.

The two sides had eight hours of meetings, including 50 minutes of one-on-one talks between the two Presidents, with no aides other than their interpreters. The first session was devoted to the priorities of each leader. Xi Jinping's presentation made clear that the main focus of his agenda was domestic. He explained at length what he means when he talks about the "China Dream,"his governing slogan, and what reforms he intends to pursue to achieve it.In typical Chinese style he outlined long-term goals for his nation,for 2020 and for 2050. President OBAMA outlined his first-term achievements and his hopes for his second term. The two then discussed the international scene and the challenges and opportunities it presented. The conversation was far more informal than usual; it was even personal. In talking about poverty, Xi described his years of hardship during the Cultural Revolution. Obama talked about spending four years as a boy in Indonesia at a time when the countrywas largely rural and poor.In the middle of the first night's dinner, the Chinese team surprised their hosts by bringing out Moutai, the famous (or infamous) sorghum-based liquor, for a special toast.Perhaps they thought it would help grease the summit;Henry Kissinger is said to have told China's former supreme leader Deng Xiaoping, "I think if we drink enough Moutai, we can solve anything." While the purpose of the meeting was to build trust rather than produce a set of results, progress was made on specific issues.The Chinese already made one important shift in policy, long sought by the Americans, even before they got to California. A week before the summit, Xi told a North Korean envoy that his country had to re-engage in a diplomatic process whosegoal was to rid Pyongyang of nuclear weapons.Reflectingon the conversations at Sunnylands, Donilon told me, "On North Korea, China now sees the denuclearization of North Korea as its top goal."

In the discussions on economics,contentious issues like cyberattacks came up, and each side stood its ground, but even here there was a search for opportunities for increased cooperation.Obama pointed out to Xi that given China's vast resources of shale and America's leading-edge extraction technology, there was an opportunity for economic cooperation that

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would benefit both. Xi had his own list of such opportunities, like Chinese investment to fund U.S. infrastructure projects.

AEREAAS OF TENSION WERE DISCUSSED, INCLUDING China's relations with Japan, on which the Chinese were impassioned. But the atmosphere was somewhat different this time. In the past, Beijing has argued the Obama Administration's "pivot" to Asia looked to it like a strategy to contain China. At this meeting, Donilon said, "the Chinese leaders made clear that they understood and appreciated America's historic role in Asia in providing stability." This is mostly rhetoric and atmospherics. "The true test of this summit will be in two or three or five years," Donilon acknowledged, "when this background goodwill has to get translated into specific actions on both sides." Clearly both sides will have to follow up in the years ahead. But it is a significant achievement to create goodwill and trust between two countries that are so different in so many dimensions and could easily become adversaries. When historians write about China's renaissance and America's role in ensuring its peaceful rise, they highlight the meetings between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai in 1972 and between Jimmy Carter and Deng in 1979. If things go well, perhaps they will add to that list this meeting between Obama and Xi in the California desert.

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